Denial or Punishment: Assessing Deterrence Effectiveness

Denial or Punishment

Deterrence is defined as the practice of discouraging someone from armed actions by altering his cost-benefit calculations, making the prospective cost and risk outweigh potential gains.

Therefore, a deterrence strategy aims to alter the enemy's intention by changing the aggressor's cost-benefit calculation so that pursuing the aggression is no longer favourable. To this end, it can act either on the first term of the calculation (the costs and risks) or the second (the benefits):

1. In the first case, the target increases the costs and risks perceived by the aggressor, should he attack, through the threat of retaliation.
2. In the second case, the target diminishes or deprives the benefits the aggressor would gain from the attack.

Let us begin with the analysis of the second case.

1. Deterrence by Denial

When thinking of deterrence, one often refers to a strategy based on threat or punishment. However, since deterrence must alter the cost-benefit calculation, it can also be accomplished by denying the aggressor any advantage from the action to be deterred - deny the benefit.

This case is termed deterrence by denial.

A deterrence strategy by denial seeks to achieve its aim of deterring a harmful enemy action

“by making it infeasible or unlikely to succeed, thus denying a potential aggressor confidence in attaining its objectives” (Mazarr, 2021, p.15).

1. For instance, a country dependent on a single trading partner for natural gas as its main energy source could be subject to potential economic coercion. To avoid being the victim of such coercion power, a good strategy of deterrence by denial would be to diversify the import markets for gas and other raw materials, build storage facilities and invest in renewable energy, making its economy resilient to disruptions. By reducing its vulnerability, the country denies its counterpart the ability to manipulate it, discouraging any attempt at economic pressure.
2. Another example. If the aggressor's objective were to gain territory through armed conquest, an effective denial strategy would involve building a sophisticated fortification system or deploying substantial military forces along the threatened border. This would make territorial gains for the aggressor unlikely, denying him his objective, and thereby deterring the attack. In this instance, the capacity to deter would also be a capacity to defend. This is because “deterrence and defence are analytically distinct but [end up being] thoroughly interrelated in practice” (Morgan, 1983, p.32).

1.2. Cost-Benefit Analysis

Deterrence by denial, when it comes to the 4 factors that make up the cost-benefit calculation on which the enemy bases whether to proceed with the aggression or not, affects all three on which deterrence can have an impact.

1. Deterrence cannot influence the assessment of the enemy’s war objective, which remains to destabilise the economy or gain territory.
2. Thanks to the denial strategy, the better resilience of the system - both the energy and military defence systems - would raise the costs for the aggressor. To achieve its objectives, the aggressor would need to exert greater effort over a longer period, all while facing the possibility of failure. In the case of economic coercion, this could lead to significant economic losses from the loss of a buyer, while in the military scenario, it would also entail greater human casualties.
3. The possibility of a response to the aggressor's action - the credibility of the deterrent action - would be maximised. In the case of economic aggression, the implementation of a source diversification strategy would be a pre-emptive deterrent action and therefore there would be no doubt that the aggressor's attempts at economic coercion would be ineffective. Similarly, in the case of military aggression, credibility would be firmly established, as deterrence would fundamentally involve a defensive posture: it is highly unlikely that one would choose not to defend itself when confronted with an attack. Therefore, there would be no uncertainty regarding the implementation of the deterrent action.
4. Lastly, the aggressor's probability of winning its objective is minimal, as effectively countered by the denial deterrence strategy.

It therefore seems that deterrence by denial strategies are very effective. Indeed, as “most classic studies suggest”, “denial strategies are inherently more reliable than punishment strategies” (Huth & Russett, 1988, p.16).

2. Deterrence by Punishment

Aiming to alter the aggressor’s cost-benefit calculation, deterrence by punishment does not focus on reducing or denying the benefit of the aggressor’s action. Instead, it seeks to increase the overall cost of the aggressor’s attack by threatening greater consequences than mere defence.

Deterrence by punishment “consists of the threat of great harm which will be imposed after the opponent has engaged in unwanted behaviour” (Noll et al., 2021, p.111).

• For instance, if facing the threat of an attack on its border, a country may deter the aggression by threatening to target its opponent's capital with long-range missiles. Such a retaliation would result in extensive civilian casualties and devastate the nation's political, strategic, and economic centre. This unacceptable damage could prompt the aggressor to reconsider before proceeding with its attack.

2.2. Cost-Benefit Analysis

Deterrence by punishment, compared to deterrence by denial, does not leverage all the factors on which the aggressor’s cost-benefit calculation is based.

1. As deterrence by denial, deterrence by punishment cannot influence the assessment of the enemy’s war objective, which remains to gain territory.
2. The potential retaliatory action resulting from a deterrence-by-punishment strategy would increase the costs of an aggressive action. In the example above, the aggressor must consider not only the costs of the offensive operation facing the opposing defence but also the additional costs associated with the potential bombing of its capital - the deterrent threat.
3. When it comes to the probability of the deterrer actually carrying out the threatened punishment - the credibility of the deterrent action -, this is not 100%, as in the example of deterrence by denial, where direct defence can be given for granted. In some cases, the deterring state may indeed “hesitate[s] to follow through on threats to punish because of attendant risks, such as further escalation, that” it “may not be willing to run once the moment arrives” (Mazarr, 2021, p.16). In our example, bombing the aggressor's capital could result in such significant civilian casualties that the defending country would be unable to accept, whether due to moral considerations or respect for International Law. If this were true, the aggressor would assess the threat as not credible and consequently pursue his aggressive action, without fearing the defender’s retaliation. Unlike deterrence by denial, where the focus is on actual defensive capability, the aggressor’s assessment of deterrence by punishment hinges on judging the deterrer’s intent to fulfil the threatened response (Snyder, 1961).

4. Lastly, the punishment has no direct effect on the aggressor's probability of winning its objective. Indeed, the defender's bombing of the aggressor's capital does not directly impact the aggressor's chances of successfully conquering the opponent's territory.

It is important to highlight the inverse relationship between the potential costs faced by the aggressor and the credibility of the deterrer in executing the threat. As the cost to the aggressor increases, the credibility of the threat decreases. This reaches an extreme in the case of nuclear deterrence. Here, the cost to the aggressor, should the retaliation be carried out, would be immeasurable. while the deterrer’s credibility in actually deploying a nuclear strike would be minimal since such an action would not serve its interests either. (Snyder, 1961). This inverse relationship leads to the dilemma of massive retaliation.

3. Other Forms of Deterrence

3.1. Military and non-Military Deterrence

When analysing deterrence, it is common to encounter various interpretations of the concept. Indeed, it can be understood in two distinct ways: in a narrow sense, it specifically refers to the use of military means to prevent hostile actions. In a broader context, however, deterrence involves the use of a range of non-military means aimed at achieving the same objective.

Consequently, deterrence can be defined as either

“the discouragement of military aggression by the threat (implicit or explicit) of applying military force in response to the aggression” (Snyder, 1960, p.167)

or “the persuasion of one’s opponent that the costs and/or risks of a given course of action he might take outweigh its benefits” (George & Smoke, 1974, p.1).

Using non-military means for deterrence, such as economic levers or diplomatic concessions, can be less provocative and may help avoid further escalation with the adversary.

3.2. Direct and Extended Deterrence

Depending on the circumstances for which deterrence is used, a distinction can be made between direct and extended deterrence.

• Direct deterrence refers to a state’s efforts to prevent aggression aimed directly at itself.
• Extended deterrence, also known as third-party deterrence, aims to protect third parties such as allies, client states, or partners (Huth & Russett, 1988).

Extended deterrence is obviously the most complicated and, historically, the riskiest. This is due to two main factors: the complexity of the military operations involved in deterrence and issues of credibility (Mazarr, 2021).

1. First of all, it is inherently more challenging to threaten a distant enemy, as the threat itself feels more remote. The deterrer must project its military force far from its own position to effectively carry out the threat.
2. Second of all, an aggressor “can almost always be certain a state will fight to defend itself, but it may doubt that a defender will fulfil a pledge to defend a third party” (Mazarr, 2021, p.16).
3. Furthermore, extended defence is considered riskier. Tying one’s fate to that of other powers can quickly escalate into a broader conflict, should deterrence fail. For this reason, cases of extended deterrence are often accompanied by a degree of flexibility in the phrasing of threat statements. Even the greatest deterrence treaty today contains a minimum of leeway. In fact, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty does not compel the allies to enter the war directly but rather to take “forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area” (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 1949).

3.3. General and Immediate Deterrence

Lastly, if one focuses on the temporal aspect of deterrence, two distinct models can be distinguished: general and immediate deterrence.

• General deterrence refers to a continuous and ongoing state of deterrence between two opposing actors who remain vigilant at all times, even in the absence of a specific crisis. Their relationship is regulated through their armed forces and the underlying fear of potential conflict. (Mazarr, 2021).
• Immediate deterrence concerns “the relationship between opposing states where at least one side is seriously considering an attack while the other is mounting a threat of retaliation in order to prevent it” (Morgan, 1983, p.28).

Immediate deterrence stems from emergency situations, typically during crises. Since general deterrence is typically more effective than immediate deterrence, its primary goal is often to prevent the necessity of the latter. In this two-way relationship, general deterrence seeks to avoid immediate deterrence, while immediate deterrence aims to restore general deterrence. Nevertheless, when immediate deterrence becomes necessary, it is often too late to avert aggression. Achieving successful immediate deterrence can be challenging, as the aggressor, having initiated the crisis, is now committed to their course of action, making the prospect of backing down unlikely (Morgan, 1983, p.28).

📌Key Takeaways

Deterrence is the practice of discouraging someone from armed actions by altering his cost-benefit calculations, making the prospective cost and risk outweigh potential gains. This can be achieved in two ways:

1. Increasing Costs and Risks (Deterrence by Punishment): The defender raises perceived costs and risks through the threat of retaliation, discouraging the aggressor from attacking.
2. Reducing or Denying Benefits (Deterrence by Denial): The defender reduces or eliminates the benefits the aggressor might gain, making the attack less appealing.

Denial strategies are inherently more reliable than punishment strategies.

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